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BOOK REVIEWS
(2d ed.). By
Fred E.Inbau and John E. Reid. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company. 1967. Pp. xiii, 224. $8.00.
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

In his landmark majority opinion in Miranda v. Arizona,' Chief
Justice Earl Warren quoted freely from the first edition of Criminal
Interrogationand Confessions.2 He did so not only to illustrate the
inherently coercive nature of the incommunicado, police-dominated
atmosphere existing during custodial interrogation, but also to justify the safeguards for individual liberty formulated in Miranda.
As a result of the Miranda decision, it was to be expected that
Messrs. Inbau and Reid would issue a retort, but the second edition
of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions fails in this respect.
While paying lipservice to the safeguards formulated by the Supreme Court, the authors ignore the very essence of the Court's purpose in Miranda. The tenor of the book is established in the introduction, where it is claimed that, "The Court's critical comments
about the procedures we advocated were, we believe, for the purpose of establishing the necessity for the warnings rather than as a
condemnation of the procedures themselves."' From this starting
point it is more than easy for the authors to conclude that the procedures they have always advocated are still within the law so long
as the Miranda warnings are given to the suspect. The Supreme
Court, however, did not consider the constitutional warnings the
ultimate end it was seeking but rather only one means of assuring
that end: dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings so that a statement obtained from the defendant would truly
be the product of his free choice. Likewise, it should be clear to all
lawyers and policemen that the coercive atmosphere can be produced even with the recitation of the suspect's constitutional warnings, and, this reviewer submits, the procedures advocated in Criminal Interrogationand Confessions are designed to create - not dispel - just such an atmosphere.
The cornerstone of the Inbau-Reid philosophy is that no tactic
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 F.INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962).
3
F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (2d ed.
1967).
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or technique which they advocate is apt to make an innocent person
confess. While such a philosophy is commendable, it is, at least,
debatable. In spite of all that has been said and written, the authors still recommend to an interrogator that the only meaningful
rule of thumb is to ask himself: "Is what I am about to do, or say,
apt to make an innocent person confess?" 4 To advocate and rely
upon the test of trustworthiness as the only meaningful and fair
rule for determining the admissibility of confessions is not merely
to reject the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in this
area, Miranda, but also to reject the history of criminal procedure
for the past 25 years. It is to deny the federal rule formulated in
1943 holding that confessions obtained by federal police officers
should not be admitted into evidence if the defendant was not
promptly brought before a federal commissioner after his arrest,5
and it is to further ignore the Supreme Court's first attempt at formulating a general rule governing the admissibility of confessions
in state courts: that subjecting a suspect to 36 hours of incommunicado interrogation, without permitting him to sleep, is inherently
coercive and a violation of due process.6 Displaying one of the
greatest communications gaps in the history of the United States,
Professor Inbau and Director Reid are, in effect, saying that the
only important test is whether the confession is trustworthy, i.e.,
whether the suspect is guilty or innocent. The Supreme Court, on
the other hand, has been saying for 25 years that the ultimate guilt
or innocence of the defendant is not the sole concern for the system,
and that a supposedly civilized and democratic society cannot exist
unless we bring the means for determining guilt or innocence within the constitutional framework.' The only way to do this is to in4Id. at 163.

5 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
6
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
7
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959), where Chief Justice Warren
stated:
The abhorence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent unthrustworthiness. It also turns on the deeprooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that
in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves ....

In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1960), Justice Frankfurter seemingly
put an end to this discussion by declaring:
From a fair reading of [the decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut], we cannot but conclude that the question whether Rogers' confessions were admissible into evidence was answered by reference to a legal
standard which took into account the circumstance of probable truth or fal-
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sure that the presumption of innocence, right to counsel, and privilege against self-incrimination exist in the police station as well as
in the criminal court.'
Many of the specific tactics and techniques recommended by
the authors are innocuous in themselves but when taken together
they all add up to create an atmosphere that is designed to throw
the suspect off balance and to convince him that the interrogator is
in complete command. A quiet room, set aside from the usual
humdrum of a police station and into which no one will have occasion to enter, is recommended. The room should be bare, devoid
of all reminders that the suspect is in a police station and free from
all ornaments and objects which may serve to relieve tension. The
best type of room is one without windows! An adjoining room
should be provided with a two-way mirror. The two-way mirror is
necessary to permit other investigating officers to observe, hear, and
be prepared for whatever role they may play in the interrogation,
to permit a policewoman to observe when a woman is interrogated
to safeguard against false accusations of misconduct, and to keep the
suspect under surveillance when he is left alone in order to prevent
escape or suicide.9 But the authors see no need, apparently, for disinterested third persons to use the two-way mirror permitting them
to observe the interrogation thereby insuring that the suspect's constitutional rights have been observed."0
Inbau and Reid treat the attitude and conduct of the interrogator as a subject for lengthy discourse." He should, they recomsity. And this is not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The attention of the trial judge should have
been focused, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, on the question whether
the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear
petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined - a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or
not petitioner in fact spoke the truth.
8 See Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (A. Howard ed. 1965); Herman, The
Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogations,25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449 (1964).
9 F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 3, at 11-13.
10 There is an absolute attitude that prevails throughout the book that the police do
all that is expected of them and that police brutality, while to be condemned, is so rare
that it is not worth mentioning. If this is true, one can only wonder why the authors
considered it necessary to advise how to obtain a legally valid confession from a person
who has been mistreated or threatened in any way (if such a confession is at all possible).
11 F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 3, at 17-23. The authors advise the interrogator
to wear civilian clothes rather than a uniform to avoid reminding the suspect of the
consequences of an incriminating disclosure. The interrogator should wear a conservative suit or jacket (because a shirt-sleeved interrogator does not command respect) and
"avoid any loud ties." Id. at 18. The interrogator is also advised to be free of any of-
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mend, sit in a chair immediately opposite the suspect, with nothing
in between. While the chairs may be separated by 2 or 3 feet
in the beginning, once the interrogation is under way '"the interrogator should move his chair in closer, so that, ultimately, one
of the subject's knees is just about in between the interrogator's two
knees."' 2 It is at this point, the authors imply, that the Miranda
warnings should be given. It is this reviewer's opinion, however,
that under these circumstances the Mirandawarnings might even be
dispensed with because they will have little or no effect, at least
upon the suspect who is unfamiliar with police procedures and his
own constitutional rights! Once the suspect has been brought into
the little, windowless room and sat in a chair immediately facing
the interrogator, and possibly already in the vise created by the interrogator's two knees, the import of the Miranda warnings would
be lost. The situation bears no resemblance to the atmosphere envisioned in Chief Justice Warren's statement that "the warning will
show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize
his privilege should he choose to exercise it."'" On the contrary, the
issuance of the warning under these circumstances will only aid in
creating the inherently coercive atmosphere that the Supreme Court
was trying to dispel. On the basis of all this preparation leading up
to the issuance of the warnings, a reasonable person might wonder
whether the interrogators are, in fact, prepared to recognize the right
of the suspect not to answer any questions should he choose this
alternative.
The interrogator, continue the authors, should always display an
air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and give no indication that
he is being influenced by the suspect's disclaimer of guilt, even when
the reasonable implication of the suspect's statements points to his
innocence. Similarly, to retain control of the situation, the suspect
should not be permitted to offer any exculpating explanation about
a particular piece of incriminating evidence because it would bolster
his confidence.' 4 Above all, the interrogator should make the suspect believe that he already has the evidence necessary to convict
fensive breath odor and to talk at close range with a fellow interrogator just before
entering the interrogation room, "with the understanding that he will advise the interrogator of any possible offensive breath odors." Id. at 19. The authors even recommend
a remedy for offensive breath odors.
12 Id. at 27.
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
14 This alone gives rise to a doubt concerning the validity of the claim that interrogation gives the innocent person an opportunity to demonstrate his innocence.
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him and wants the suspect's confession only to corroborate the evidence that the police have. In summary, the authors advocate that
all psychological tactics should be used on the suspect so long as
they fall short of specific tactics which have been prohibited by the
courts. Since the courts will not tolerate promises or threats, the
interrogator should speak in generalities to remain within permissible bounds. While trickery and deceit have been condemned by
the Supreme Court, the authors contend that "no case has prohibited
their usage"' 5 and such techniques are recommended so long as the
trickery and deceit are not apt to make an innocent person confess.
Understanding, sympathy, pride, the suspect's family, and even religion are recommended as tools for making a hesitant person confess. The authors would have us believe that in spite of what the
Supreme Court has said these techniques are not calculated to overcome the suspect's will to resist but, in fact, are designed to help
the suspect achieve what he is really seeking: an opportunity to unburden himself of this terrible guilt. Somehow, however, this just
doesn't ring true. Whatever euphemism is used, the Inbau-Reid
techniques are designed only to dissuade a suspect from exercising
his constitutional rights and to persuade him, against his will, to
confess to a crime. The authors contend that the only step left to
the Supreme Court is to prohibit the use of these techniques, specifically deceit and trickery, and they further claim that if the Court
chooses to do so it will eliminate the confession as a meaningful tool
for fighting crime. To threaten dire consequences from Supreme
Court decisions is an old dodge which sometimes works. But it
should be dear that more rules are not necessary; enforcement of
the spirit of the Supreme Court's decisions of the past 25 years in
this area would alone insure that the only confessions used in the
future are truly voluntary.
Criminal Interrogationand Confessions was not written for the
lawyer or judge; the criminal lawyer, however, should read the book
to see what he is up against. The book was written for the police
interrogator, but the authors have failed their self-chosen constituency. Granted it is difficult to tell a group with which you sympathize that its long-tested and effective methods for doing its job are
wrong, especially so when you have been teaching and advising the
group to use these methods for many years. But that is exactly what
was needed. Instead of assuring the police that the responsibility
for the unfortunate consequences of recent decisions rest not upon
35 F.INBAU & J. RarD, supra note 3, at 196.
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them but on the Supreme Court, and instead of reassuring the police that the old tactics and techniques can still be used, the authors
could have used their position of respect with their constituency to
explain the meaning of Miranda and what it requires. This they
have not done and their own intransigency can only result in more
decisions imposing greater restrictions upon criminal interrogation
and confessions.
LEwis R. KATZ*

DELINQUENCY CAN BE STOPPED. By Judge Lester H. Loble and

Max Wylie.

New York:

McGraw-Hill.

Pp. x, 148.

$4.95.

Delinquency Can Be Stopped represents a reflection of the
thoughts of an experienced juvenile court judge, Lester H. Loble of
Helena, Montana. Perhaps the attitude and firm position of Judge
Loble can best be exemplified by the following excerpt:
If a youth is old enough and tough enough to topple a tombstone,
wreck a church or schoolhouse, hold up a service station, snatch a
woman's purse or beat up an old man, he is old enough and tough
enough to have a public trial with his parents in the front row
and full newspaper coverage.'
Initially, one's response to this "get tough" attitude might be:
"Does not Judge Loble's reaction militate against the existence of
the very court on which he sits?" For, if youngsters are to be
treated as ordinary adult criminal defendants, subject to all the incidents of criminal proceedings, why is there a need for a special "juvenile" court? It is precisely this equation of juvenile offenders
with adult criminal defendants by the state juvenile court systems
that prompted the Supreme Court's recent extension of the constitutional due process criminal procedure safeguards to juveniles in
the In re Gault decision.2 Consequently, it appears that Judge
Loble's "get tough" thesis, promulgated prior to the Gault decision,
has been shackled by the Supreme Court, and rightly so, in response
to the very premise (equation of juvenile offenders with adult criminal defendants) upon which Judge Loble's thesis is based. It is the
opinion of this reviewer, however, that the Court, through Mr. Justice Fortas, has not foreclosed the possibility of a state juvenile
court system which does, in fact, muster up to the rehabilitative ideal
conceived by the liberal "reformers" in Chicago in 1899.' Rather,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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I read the Gault decision as sanctioning a state juvenile court system
minus the full-blown adult criminal procedural due process safeguards where that state system does provide the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children by the reforming
founders of the juvenile court concept.4
Judge Loble is sharply critical of the rehabilitative ideal while
simultaneously concerned about punishment. He states, with respect to the juvenile court law passed in Chicago in 1899 which
served as the model for the New York City juvenile court system, as
well as most other such American efforts, that: "The people who
have been in charge and who are in charge right now of the thinking of law enforcement, in juvenile crime areas, are still operating
under that law, obsolete, boneheaded, and corroding."5 Perhaps
the law of 1899 and its rehabilitative parens patriae ideal are sound
and socially desirable, if and when properly implemented, and it is
the thinking of the law enforcement officials which should be characterized as "obsolete, boneheaded, and corroding."
Perhaps it is this abuse of the parens patriae discretion granted
to law enforcement officials by the juvenile justice system which
should be the subject of Judge Loble's "get tough" approach. If
the systems of juvenile "injustice" were cleaned up by the states and
the proper measure of welfare efforts and financial resources were
channeled by the states into the establishment of a rehabilitative,
care-oriented system in accord with the liberal 1899 reform ideal,
rather than a punishment-oriented system, decisions like Gault
would be unnecessary. If this is what the Supreme Court meant to
say in Gault, and I think it is, the Court should have done so in a
more clear and unequivocal manner.
Finally, Judge Loble suggests that "exposure in open court, instead of concealment in the underbrush of our rehabilitative system ....I" is the solution to the problem of juvenile delinquency.
Unfortunately, this proposal places its concern after the fact rather
than before the fact. It smacks of a hard-nosed, nonjuristic response
I L. LOBLE &

M.

WYLIE,DELINQUENCY CAN BE STOPPED

145 (1967).

2387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3 See the Court's discussion of this early reform movement in id. at 14-16.
4See id. at 17-18, including the Court's footnote 23 noting Handler, The Juvenile
Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
7 and Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice,
79 HARV.L. REV.775 (1966).
5 L. LOBLE & M. WYLIE,supra note 1, at 30.
6Id.at 144.
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"let's fry the little bastards." Would not society better be served
by a Christian rehabilitative reform approach - "let's save the little
bastards"?
Juveniles are different from adult criminal offenders. This fact,
unfortunately, is not recognized and acted upon by Judge Loble, and
his book makes one ask if his solution is not worse than the problem.
-

KENNETH IRA SOLOMON*
0 Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.

